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(F. Bétrisey).Payments for environmental services (PES) are very often considered emblematic of the neoliberal trend in
natural resources and ecosystemmanagement. Even if they have been largely criticized as contributing to
the commodification of nature, theirworldwide application is obvious. The explanation of their diffusion in
poor countries and regions can be partially attributed to the fact that PES are promoted as a ‘‘win–win”
solution, capable of improving sustainable management of natural resources as well as reducing poverty.
Inscribed in a liberal conception of poverty, most of the investigations on PES concentrate on the question
of access of the poor to PES schemes—aswell as towidermarkets—on redistribution of benefits and on poor
people’s income increase. Studying a Bolivian PES, we show that broadening the foregoing conceptualiza-
tion of poverty to a more relational understanding allows better taking into account local views and
structural determinants of poverty and therefore allows better reporting of the complexity of poverty alle-
viation implications of such natural resource management initiatives. It is a first and necessary step in
designing PES that could increase both natural resource conservation and social justice in marginalized
areas.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Payments for environmental services (PES) are a natural
resource management principle that aims at internalizing positive
environmental externalities. PES intend to transform environmen-
tal services (like carbon storage or water purification) into com-
modities for becoming objects of market transactions between
sellers and buyers. PES are seen as belonging to a set of tools
related to a neoliberalizing trend in environmental governance.
Emphasis is placed on public–private partnerships and market-
based mechanisms as efficient ways to use, conserve and allocate
natural resources.
In spite of criticism about their underlying economistic vision of
nature and governance (Kosoy & Corbera, 2010), PES are now
widely applied. Part of their legitimacy in developing countries
comes from the assumption that they can promote forest conserva-
tion, as well as poverty reduction (McAfee & Shapiro, 2010), in a
‘‘win–win” approach. The contribution of PES to poverty alleviation
mostly concerns PES’ ability to facilitate market access and/orr Ltd.
icense (http://creativecommons.org
t Durabilité, UNIL-MOULINE,
florence.betrisey@unil.chrevenue increase. Accordingly, research on other than material
and monetary impacts of PES on poverty is rare (Greiner &
Stanley, 2013).
After recalling the foundations of the neoliberal analysis of
poverty and their implications for PES assessment methods, we
move beyond the money metrics by analyzing a Bolivian PES called
‘‘Acuerdos Recíprocos por el Agua (ARA)”.1 We show that social recog-
nition represents a central evaluation criterion of locals to partici-
pate in the ARA. We illustrate how the ARA are constructing
recognition relationships and how this could lead to the transforma-
tion or reproduction of existing institutions and power structures.2. Poverty and poverty alleviation through PES
The theoretical and conceptual anchor of neoliberalism refers to
a ‘‘classical liberalism” claiming for minimal state interventions
and submitting ‘‘all human activities, values, institutions, and
practices to market principles” (p. 118) (Brown, 2011). Despite local
variations in the implementation of the neoliberal paradigm,
the dissemination of the neoliberal doxa has mutated public
policy. Many States have moved from an interventionist and/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1 Reciprocal agreements on water.
F. Bétrisey et al. /World Development Perspectives 1 (2016) 6–11 7counter-cyclical economic governance to policies that prioritize
deregulation as a means of enhancing entrepreneurial activity.
Hence, poverty is seen as a condition of a residual group of ill-
adaptedpeople (Thorsen&Lie, 2006). Poorpeopleunderstood in this
way can only be lifted out of poverty through trickling down of eco-
nomic growthand through the suppression of all alleged ‘‘premiums
on laziness” introduced by thewelfare state (social security benefits
without counterparts, etc.). The latter are considered as reinforcing
the passive acceptance of unequal and clientelist relationships pre-
venting individuals from ‘‘improv[ing] their capacities and inclina-
tions as economic citizens” (p. 5) (Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2009).
Therefore, themain strategy for alleviating poverty consists in liber-
alizing economic relations and creating appropriate incentives for
making agents fit the market conditions (p. 6) (Dixon, 2012).
We will see how this vision of poverty runs through the debate
on PES’ poverty alleviation potential and why it needs to be
nuanced to address both local views on poverty and structural
determinants of the latter.
Engel, Pagiola, andWunder (2008) considered the PES initiatives
as having a win–win character from ‘‘generating profits to land users
while generating [environmental] positive externalities” for society as
a whole, measurable through the ‘‘net profitability of land-uses” (op.
cit.: 670). Moreover, even if PES initiatives have not been originally
designed as pro-poor but to promote conservation (Pagiola,
Arcenas, & Platais, 2005), the UK’s Department for International
Development (DFID) created in 2010 the Ecosystem Services for Pov-
erty Alleviation initiative; the latter pretends to ‘‘provide new knowl-
edge demonstrating how ecosystem services can reduce poverty and
enhance well-being for the world’s poor” (p. 1) (ESPA (Ecosystem
Services for Poverty alleviation), 2012). Since then, conservation
through PES is also presented as ‘‘an unrivaled opportunity to combat
poverty” (p. 3) (ESPA (Ecosystem Services for Poverty alleviation),
2011) because the poorest are often the most dependent on natural
resources for their livelihoods. PES would then help secure the
livelihoods of the poor. PES are also praised for their ability to for-
malize and secure private property rights on land (Leimona & Lee,
2008). In a Coasian perspective, this is a crucial element within
the neoliberal vision of poverty alleviation, yet private land titles
facilitate access to the credit system (Pirard, 2012).
A special issue of Land Use Policy Journal on the social dimen-
sions of market-based instruments2 illustrates this neoliberal fram-
ing of poverty and social issues. Zammit (2013) focuses on the
question of access of the poor to PES.3 She investigates the a priori
capacities of the poorest to access PES but does not question whether
accessing PES schemes equates with active participation of the poor
and, above all, if this actually has a positive impact on their poverty
situation. By doing so, such studies tend to create a positive bias
toward PES, considering PES as systematically positive for the poor-
est as long as they can access it. As for Hoang, Do, Pham, van
Noordwijk, and Minang (2013), who analyze the distribution of ben-
efits among PES participants in Vietnam, and Courtney, Mills,
Gaskell, and Chaplin (2013), who concentrate on the indirect effects
of PES on regional employment in Europe. Those studies tend to
focus on the distribution of material and monetary assets, conceiving
poverty and equity in distributional terms only.
Few studies went beyond this distributional framing including
criteria like ‘‘non-income-related provider social co-benefits” (p. 6)
(Greiner & Stanley, 2013), ‘‘social status within society” (p. 171)
(German, Ruhweza, Mwesigwa, & Kalanzi, 2010) and increase in
local leadership. However, the measurement of the monetary and
material impacts of PES remains dominant; Caplow, Jagger,
Lawlor, and Sills (2011) argue for finding ‘‘measures that use2 2013, vol. 31.
3 Presenting a comparison of PES in various continents, they question the impact of
unequal levels of wealth, knowledge and land tenure on individual access to PES.common metrics and scales for analyzing both biophysical and welfare
outcomes” (op. cit.: 164).
2.1. Contextualized conception of poverty beyond material deprivation
The paradigm of material and monetary poverty explores pov-
erty in terms of an individual falling below an arbitrary threshold
of income, the poverty line, preventing him from acquiring goods
and services considered necessary. This definition, as accurate as
it is, does not take into account that if poverty means lack of
resources, it is also a social construction since the lack of resources
reflects the living standards and expectations within a particular
society. Structuralists have focused on the influence of class or gen-
der and their intersections on shaping poverty. Post-structuralists
recognize the regulatory power of discourses and routines on the
social practice and the construction of poverty. Agency4 then inter-
acts with those social structures (p. 111) Ifejika Speranza,
Wiesmann, & Rist, 2014, leading to situations of relative well-
being or poverty. Consequently, poverty is contingent, linked to
social representations and individual experiences, and is embedded
in value systems. These approaches justify adding qualitative per-
spectives and metrics of poverty assessments.
The importance of the status of the poor (Paugam, 2005) and
the evaluation of who is considered by himself or others as
poor—or not—is central in research on the Andean communities;
especially because of the current spreading of the ‘‘vivir bien” con-
cept, contributing to a postmodernist perception of well-being and
poverty. ‘‘Vivir bien” refers to being ‘‘in a relationship” with other
persons and nature, focusing on connectivity between biocenosis
and biotope (Medina, 2011), or to an economy of care (León,
2008). The term poverty does not exist in the Aymara and Quechua
languages (Mallard, 2014). In an emic understanding, poverty
refers to not-vivir-bien, not being ‘‘in a relationship”, being isolated,
not included in webs of reciprocity that span across different
spheres of life. To some extent, the ‘‘vivir bien y no mejor” discourse
of the Bolivian government could be considered as referring to the
concept of degrowth (Martínez-Alier, 2012). Poverty does not only
depend on access to a quantity of material goods or services but on
the quality of goods and relationships between members of a com-
munity living in a specific milieu.
Consequently, from a scientific as well as from a policy point of
view, the impacts of PES schemes on poverty alleviation should be
carefully analyzed, using a broader conception of poverty, includ-
ing both material and relational dimensions, and being sensitive
to locals’ perceptions.
3. The case of the ‘‘Acuerdos Recíprocos por el Agua’’
The PES scheme ‘‘Acuerdos Recíprocos por el Agua” concerns the
creation of a new institution linking up- and downstream actors
through a local fund, used for channeling of financial contributions
from downstream water users, mainly municipal authorities and
local water cooperatives of the downstream villages.5
Since the early 2000s, the Natura Bolivia Foundation (NBF), a
local NGO active in the area of forest conservation in the depart-
ment of Santa Cruz, eastern Bolivia, has coordinated the above
mentioned actors and has also contributed financially to the local
fund. The money of this fund serves to compensate farmers in
the upstream communities, who previously agreed to put part of
their forestland under conservation (i.e. not deforesting) and con-
centrate grazing in a small, enclosed portion of their land.4 Understood as a capacity to act and react over structures, not always intentional.
5 Municipal authority transfers part of its annual budget to the fund and
cooperative members pay a supplementary fee on their water bills going directly to
the fund.
Table 1
Communities and respective municipalities investigated.
Municipality Downstream villages (name of
capital is in italics)
Highland communities
El Torno El Torno, Jorochito, La Angostura,
Limoncito, San Luis, Santa Rita
Huaracal, La Lira,
Quebrada León, Villa
Paraíso
Pampagrande Los Negros, Pampagrande Palma Sola, Santa Rosa
de Lima
Mairana Mairana Cerro Verde, La Yunga
Quirusillas Quirusillas Filadelfia, Rodeo, San
Luis
Comarapa Comarapa, Saipina, San Juan del
Potrero
Verdecillos, Estancia
Vieja, Cabracancha
Source: (p. 370) (Bétrisey & Mager, 2014).
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fund and the farmers, which stipulates the duration of the agree-
ment, the amount of land preserved, the type and amount of com-
pensation granted to farmers and the allowed and prohibited
activities of land management. Compensations are ‘‘in kind” contri-
butions and consist of what NBF calls ‘‘productive alternatives”,
like beehives, fruit trees or coffee plants, and includes trainings.6
NBF also organizes socialization activities, which consist of small
events, grouping downstream and upstream actors. Those
events often have a festive atmosphere (with music and dancing or
children’s poetry/drawing contests). In the last years, however,
NBF decided to reduce these activities because of their time-
consuming character, preferring to invest time in creating new
ARA schemes in other municipalities (Anonymous, NBF, 2013).7
These ARA were subject to several investigations, which mainly
focused on the analysis of the environmental and economic rele-
vance of PES (Asquith, Vargas, & Wunder, 2008), as well as socio-
economic analysis of the type of transactions occurring within
the ARA (Bétrisey & Mager, 2015). However, as no analysis has,
to date, focused on the impact of PES on poverty according to local
views of the members of upstream communities participating in
PES, this paper analyzes this important issue.
3.1. Methodology
Investigating the local perceptions of PES requires a specific
methodological setting. Back in 2012, we conducted a qualitative
appraisal of ARA impacts in upstream communities, covering 14
communities belonging to 5 municipalities (see Table 1). All had
been participating for at least 3 years in the ARA. In 2013 and
2014, we conducted a total of 104 interviews with members of
those communities.8 Following an inductive approach, the discus-
sions were based on semi-structured interviews, trying not to
impose any preconceptions of social changes, and giving actors’
‘‘lived experience, logic and rationality a forefront place” (p. 20, pers.
trans.) (Blanchet & Gotman, 2010). We diversified our methods,
including participative observations in community and municipal
meetings involving community actors and/or the staff of NBF. In par-
allel, we conducted 16 semi-structured interviews with downstream
institutional actors participating in the ARA scheme as well as 6
semi-structured interviews with the staff of the NBF foundation.
In this paper we do not claim to provide representative results
for all PES. Instead, we aim at highlighting the complexity of PES6 On apiculture, coffee production, etc. . .
7 This strategy also allowed to quickly increase the number of forest hectare under
conservation contracts and might have followed (indirect) pressure of NBF’s
international donors for increasing ‘relevance’ and/or scaling up the ARA to meet
predefined objectives.
8 51 of them were done with actors participating in the ARA scheme and 53
nonparticipating actors were also interviewed.realities (bound to a specific place and time frame), through in-
depth depiction of one case and the use of an original frame of
analysis.
That said, as the heuristic value of semi-structured interviews
consists in their articulation with the wider ‘‘experiential context”
(p. 25, pers. trans.) (Blanchet & Gotman, 2010), we will depict here-
after the living conditions and the institutional context faced by
the upstream communities.3.2. Living conditions and institutional context of the investigated
communities
The studied upstream communities count between 15 and 110
families. They live in isolated and peripheral spaces of the central
villages located downstream. They are experiencing low accessibil-
ity, objective and subjective marginalization, as well as the exclu-
sion from infrastructures supplying basic education and health. As
an indicator, out of the 16 educative units located in the communi-
ties, only 3 could be considered as having good level infrastruc-
tures, and 11 had no electricity. On the contrary, good level
infrastructure characterized 4 out of the 7 units located in the
downstream villages, all equipped with electricity (pp. 36–37)
(Prefectura del Departamento de Santa Cruz, 2006).
The formerly practiced subsistence agriculture and pig raising
of the upstream communities have been modernized during the
last 20 years. Peasants collectively purchased tractors and individ-
ually acquired motorized pumps, increased the use of chemicals
and extended cultivated lands through slashing and burning of for-
est lands (Bétrisey & Mager, 2014). However, their standard of liv-
ing remained rather precarious, if compared to the downstream
villages and towns (Asquith et al., 2008).
Administratively, these communities belong to municipalities
but are also self-organized through agrarian unions (sindicatos) or
grassroots territorial organization (Organisaciones Territoriales de
Base–OTB); their main responsibility is to ‘‘propose, ask for, control
and supervise work execution and provision of public services accord-
ing to the necessities of the community, to propose ratification or
change of municipal authorities and access information about the eco-
nomic resource intended for popular participation” (p. 75, pers.
trans.) (Prefectura del Departamento de Santa Cruz, 2006), and is
sustained in the Popular Participation Law launched by the neolib-
eral government of Sanchez de Lozada in 1994. Among the investi-
gated communities, we first noted a very different level of
participation of comunarios in the OTB, mainly depending on the
communities but also on the personal characteristics of the comu-
narios. In communities organized around agrarian sindicatos, comu-
narios that do not own land may assist to assemblies and meetings
but have no right to vote. Thus, because such recent immigrants’
access to land is limited, most of them de facto tend to be excluded
from voting and power positions. However, even in cases where
they formally participate in institutions,9 recent immigrants are
still perceived negatively by locals or older immigrants and suffer
discrimination, sometimes even racism.
In communities organized around an OTB, women have more
chances to reach power positions, even if there is a lot of variability
regarding women’s participation in local institutions of investi-
gated communities. Women can even preside over an OTB, as in
the case of Palma Sola community, nevertheless not without suf-
fering from prejudices. Women are also often organized in parallel
institutions like club de madres, whose role is mainly to organize
schooling and community fiestas (considered women’s activities).
Regarding the community presidencies (whether they preside
OTB or sindicatos), some are considered passively fulfilling their9 Some OTB allow the non-owners to vote.
10 ‘‘Natura never took us into account as authorities. . . . Sometimes they asked me to
collaborate, but they never invited me with a written letter like they did with the ARA
participants” (Don Luis, Santa Rosa, 18.09.2013).
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ities; some community presidents are even living outside the com-
munity and are not perceived as representing the community
interests. On the contrary, others are perceived as strong lobbyists
of their communities, struggling to get municipal authorities inter-
ested for the sake of the community.
All things considered, many of the interviewed community
members were concerned by the relationship between community
authorities and downstream municipal authorities, and com-
plained about a supposed abandonment by municipal authorities
and unfairness in resource distribution. Comunarios perceived this
as resulting from a low level of recognition and leading to situa-
tions of injustice.
The ARA, as new institutional arrangements, are parts of this
‘‘myriad of local dynamics occurring and in many cases even reshaping
local governance institutions” (p. 2) (Retolaza Eguren, 2008).
3.3. Implications of the ARA at the intra-community level
Regarding intra-community relationships and organization,
most of the comunarios that were participating in the ARA scheme
reported an overall positive effect. In the Palma Sola community,
the quality of relationships between comunarios participating in
the ARA and the trust level among them is said to have improved:
now, ‘‘(. . .) people are inspired and are starting to have faith in each
other” (1, Palma Sola, 25.10.2012). Moreover, the new ARA institu-
tion was considered bringing personal recognition, communica-
tively expressed by the downstream actors during public events—
through applause, photo sessions etc.—and increase the reputation
and esteem of the individuals who participated in the scheme.
However, some nonparticipating comunarios asserted that there
had been no significant changes in terms of intra-community rela-
tionships. This is mostly related to the fact that positive impacts
tend to benefit the ARA participants more than the nonpartici-
pants. The nonparticipating comunarios mainly concern two
groups: recent immigrants and small landowners. First, immi-
grants that do not own land and are already socially and politically
marginalized in community structures are de jure excluded from
the scheme, even if they ‘‘would like to participate because we like
bees and it is lovely to participate in the meetings” (2, Santa Rosa,
20.09.2013). Secondly, if owning land (formally or not) is de jure
a condition to enter the scheme, the size of the land owned also
matters; the compensation is proportional to the amount of land
that the comunarios accept putting under a conservation contract;
the ones who own very little land—and are already considered
poorer—therefore receive only small compensations; this discour-
ages them from participating in the scheme. De facto, small owners
tend to exclude themselves from the ARA.
These access barriers to the PES scheme experienced by already
marginalized and poorer individuals are strengthening material
inequalities, which have already been analyzed by other ‘‘pro-
poor” PES studies. However, what our interviews showed is that,
although acknowledging a material dimension in these inequalities
(access to material compensation), the non-access to the PES
scheme was also expressed in terms of symbolic misrecognition of
nonparticipating comunarios; thus reinforcing inequalities of sym-
bolic status. This misrecognition has led to several conflicts inside
the communities, as stated by an official of the Comarapa Munici-
pality, ‘‘so much that the municipal government had to intervene, help
and explain” (3, Comarapa, 08.08.2014). In the Santa Rosa commu-
nity, conflicts even led to violence and the killing of the cow of a
community member participating in the scheme (Asquith, 2013).
As far as women are concerned, they are neither de jure nor de
facto excluded from the scheme, except if they are an immigrant or
a small landowner. The statistics of NBF show that more than 26%
of the contracts concluded in 2014 between the fund and thecomunarios were in the name of women. Moreover, the former
female OTB president of the Palma Sola community asserted that
she received support from the NBF in her role of OTB president.
She appreciated this support, ‘‘because sometimes it is not easy as
a woman” (4, Palmasola, 18.08.2014). However, many of the inter-
viewed women asserted that they were not really aware of the pro-
ject and that we would have better talked to their husband. We
observed during several ARA meetings that women had different
attitudes than their male counterparts. Even if they sometimes
expressed opinions, they were shyer, many of them being reluctant
to make decisions (starting to participate in the ARA or not) with-
out ‘‘consulting the husband” (Meeting in Estancia Vieja,
20.08.2014). Men were more at ease making quick decisions with-
out consulting their wives (idem).
Finally, as the ARA had only been done with individuals and
never with collectives, they questioned the egalitarian concern
being traditionally promoted within the communities: ‘‘They work
individually, not with the community, and I don’t like that”
(5, Quebrada Leon, 02.09.2013). They also question the legitimacy
of community authorities,10 which was perceived negatively by
those authorities but also by some comunarios.
So, like the new producers associations or religious institutions
(mainly evangelist) that appeared in the communities, the ARA
appears as another source of recognition beyond community
authorities. At the same time it is considered as a new space of sol-
idarity and recognition for participating comunarios and as a space
of sociopolitical and material exclusion for nonparticipating comu-
narios, creating social and individual conflicts within the commu-
nity organization.
Yet, if we change scale and observe the relationships of partic-
ipating communities with municipal authorities, the appreciation
of the impact of the ARA institution on the existing relations and
their fairness might be different.
3.4. Implications of the ARA on relations with the municipalities
Some interviewed comunarios of communities noted a change
in the relationship between their community and the downstream
formal authorities (i.e. the municipal council and heads of water
cooperatives), benefiting their community as a whole. They first
stated a quantitative improvement of this relationship through
the increased number of meetings involving municipal authorities
and community representatives. These meetings were first set up
for the ARA project but rapidly became discussion forums for other
topics. This linking of communities and municipal authorities is
clearly perceived as a result of the ARA. Some downstream institu-
tional members also perceived an improvement of those relation-
ships in that they ‘‘don’t argue with upstream people anymore” (6,
Irrigators Association, Comarapa, 19.10.2012).
Upstream comunarios also mentioned a qualitative relational
improvement yet the ARA were leading to recognition of commu-
nities’ key role in the management of water resources and with
regard to increased visibility of the communities in the local polit-
ical arena: ‘‘many people got to know us so that, at the end, he [the
mayor] couldn’t ignore us [the community] anymore but had to take
us into account” (7, Palma Sola, 25.10.2012). This was also acknowl-
edged by representatives of the downstream institutional actors,
like the vice president of the irrigators association of Comarapa,
who considered that the ARA improved the municipal authorities’
consideration of the upstream communities through the better
understanding of upstream communities’ realities. According to
him ‘‘downstream authorities (. . .) understand the problems of
10 F. Bétrisey et al. /World Development Perspectives 1 (2016) 6–11upstream people” (6, Comarapa, 19.10.2012). But ‘‘this changed with
the local fund initiative from Natura” (idem) creating a new sense of
proximity between those actors. For some upstream comunarios,
this even led further to the recognition of their ‘‘human being” sta-
tus and of the necessity to cooperate to ‘‘vivir bien” (8, Villa Paraiso,
14.11.2012).
The comunarios also stated that this recognition of their role and
status came along with a redistribution—through the ARAs in kind
compensation—of economic resources from the municipal author-
ities toward the communities, mostly perceived as a fair reward for
their water management activities: ‘‘(. . .) We do something good for
the land, and it is fair to receive something in return” (9, Palma Sola,
02.11.2013). The manager of the downstream San Luis Water
Cooperative in El Torno viewed it as ‘‘fair” to redistribute resources
toward the upstream zones that have to bear the direct cost of con-
servation despite their tough living conditions and, this way ‘‘(. . .)
can have a higher income to eat every day?” (10, El Torno,
06.11.2012).
The ARA were also sometimes perceived as improving partici-
pation of some community representatives in municipal
decision-making arena. The former OTB president of the Palma
Sola community stated that the ARA, and especially the staff of
the NBF, increased her power in negotiation with municipal
authorities regarding the budget allocated to her community.
According to her, ‘‘(. . .) this would never have happened without
(. . .) this project that initiated everything because we were always
talking together with the mayor and Natura (. . .)” (4, Palma Sola,
18.08.2014).
However, even if downstream authorities, like the former
mayor of Comarapa Municipality, claim to be ‘‘more participative”
(11, Comarapa, 19.10.2012), some comunarios considered that the
relationships between their community and municipal authorities
neither improved nor deteriorated but expressed a status quo.
Authorities in those cases maintained a low level of recognition
and consideration toward the communities: ‘‘I believe that the
mayor is not interested in what happens in the communities” (12,
Filadelfia, 14.08.2014).
Some comunarios also expressed an increased distrust regarding
municipal authorities. This was often based on a feeling of opacity
of the management of the ARA, especially expressed by community
authorities.11 Indeed, if downstream actors, endeavor to increase
transparency by communicating ‘‘to explain where their money goes”
(13, Cooperativa de Agua Comarapa, 12.10.2012), this communica-
tion is mostly addressed to the downstream population and not
upstream communities. As a result, some comunarios stated that
their feeling of exclusion from municipal spaces is still strong and
has even increased in the last few years12: ‘‘We sometimes felt
excluded from the whole process. (. . .) Before, we were all getting
together, but today, no more” (2, Santa Rosa, 25.10.2012).
Despite these criticisms, as far as the relationship between com-
munities and municipal authorities is concerned, the majority of
our downstream and upstream respondents pointed out the capac-
ity of the ARA to improve public recognition of upland communi-
ties. In several cases, these marginalized communities have been
made more visible, whether as environmental, economic or politi-
cal subjects. In some cases, this recognition process also led to a
transformation of the economic redistributive model of the munic-
ipality, for the material benefit of the communities and/or to the
expansion of community representatives’ opportunities to partici-
pate in municipal spaces of politics by a collateral effect of taking11 ‘‘They capture money from several places, even outside Bolivia, and what do they do?
They use it to pay their salaries” (Don José, Comité de Agua, Quebrada Leon,
02.09.2013).
12 Corresponding to the time when NBF started reducing the socialization activities
and fiestas.part in the ARA. Recognition therefore appears to be a key positive
effect in the self-appraisal of the ARA. We will here question this
notion and its potential in terms of poverty alleviation.4. Discussion: ARA alleviating poverty through recognition?
Critical philosophers, like Honneth (2000), proposed recogni-
tion as an essential component of ‘‘good life”. Honneth defines
recognition as an intersubjective, mutual and moral relationship,
necessary in the process of creation of identity and the self. It is
a public and communicative act, expressed through different
media and not ‘‘in forno interno” (p. 286) (Kocyba, 2012). The denial
of recognition, which may take the form of contempt or ‘‘social
invisibility”, constitutes an injustice or a ‘‘symbolic discrimination”
(p. 321, pers. trans.) (Guérin, Hersent, & Fraisse, 2011). Recognition
takes place not only within the space of public institutions but also
through the ‘‘daily routine of social behaviors” (s.p., pers. trans.)
(Tinland, 2008) and informal social norms. Fraser (Fraser, 2004)
sees recognition as a necessary condition for social justice. She
asserts that both redistribution and political participation—which
she considers as the other conditions of social justice—are often
made possible through preliminary recognition.
However, if Honneth sees recognition occurring through inter-
subjective relationships, other scholars showed that recognition
could also be considered as a driver of subordination. Acknowledg-
ing that recognition is an important step in the determination of the
subject, namely the passage from an object to a subject
condition—and therefore holds emancipation potential—Butler
(2009) also highlights how this recognition desire creates attach-
ment and dependence towards the source of recognition. According
to her, this dependence relationship reinforces domination of the
‘recognized’, and the powerful position of dominant social norms.
So, where Honneth sees recognition as a vector of liberty and eman-
cipation from power that, he admits, can be perverted, Butler sees it
as a vector of subjection to power structures, legitimizing and rein-
forcing the latter. Emancipation would then not occur by merely
providing recognition to the subjects, but by changing the
conditions of it, through the formulation of subversive counter-
hegemonic discourses and practices that can appear as ‘‘alternative
recognition channels” (Allen, 2006) and lead to social change.
Using this recognition lens, our investigations show that the
ARA scheme appears—for a majority of our interviewees—to both
provide personal recognition in its own realm but also contribute
to a wider recognition of the upstream communities by down-
stream municipal authorities. With this in mind, the ARA can be
considered to alleviate not only material but also relational pov-
erty. However, if the ARA contain a potential for reducing inequal-
ities and bringing more socio-environmental justice—in terms of
recognition, equitable distribution and participation—, some peo-
ple pointed out that this capacity is not always fully realized and
is fragile. Indeed, the poverty alleviation appears sometimes rever-
sible and partial, constrained by existing power structures—e.g.
expressed in uneven access to land and natural resources or imbal-
anced participation in community decision-making—, which the
ARA have not significantly transformed. As long as the ARA will
not be able to avoid the de jure or de facto exclusion of certain
groups—e.g. immigrants, small landowners, women—they will
not prevent injustice and unfair conditions from enduring, which
seriously limits their potential of poverty reduction for all. Con-
versely, if the ARA would bring a more inclusive recognizability,
they could contribute to a greater emancipatory effect and to larger
poverty alleviation by being an alternative recognition channel for
those who are excluded from traditional recognition structures.
More mediating socialization efforts between upstream and down-
stream actors, combined with larger empowering strategies led by
F. Bétrisey et al. /World Development Perspectives 1 (2016) 6–11 11the NBF, could play a key role in creating the conditions that will
make it possible.5. Conclusion
Even if PES have been much criticized regarding their underly-
ing neoliberal discourse on nature and nature governance, the
neoliberal vision of poverty they convey still constitutes the norm
used in their evaluations. However, as the sociological literature
points out that poverty is also non-material and could be partially
considered as a lack of recognition, it appeals to analyze PES
beyond this usual emphasis on access and distribution of material
benefits. Having studied the Bolivian PES (ARA) through this prism,
we showed that the ARA contribute to creating a recognition of
upstream communities by the formerly rather disinterested down-
stream communities and the municipality, in this way acting on
structural conditions of poverty and bringing more social justice
in the sense of Fraser. However, we also highlighted the fragility
of the process and the persisting deprivation of the poorest of
the poor (immigrants, small landowners) despite the ARA.
Moreover, like Petheram and Campbell (2010), who underlined
the little use of participative methods and consequent lack of
attention to the perceptions of local peasants, we consider that
PES evaluations should be done through a more systematic and
careful listening to local views on poverty. Paugam (Paugam,
2005) had long insisted on the fact that the perception of poverty
is not universal and that its ‘‘plurality within the same society and
its possible evolution depending on social, political and economic con-
ditions” (op. cit.: 69, pers. trans.) should be insisted upon.
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